Training Area, Vicinity
of Castelfiorentino, Italy
From
1 September 1944 to 4 September 1944, the
Regiment was in training in small unit
problems and specialist training, mountain training,
map reading and conditioning marches, also
tank and Infantry co-ordination practice
problems. Much emphasis was placed
on small unit problems and tank and
Infantry co-ordination for the future operations to
come. The Second Battalion of this
Regiment was inspected by Lt. General
Mark Clark, on 4 September, while the battalion
was participating in training with
tanks and the mule pack trains. The General
indicated keen interest in the proceedings
and expressed his satisfaction of the
type of training the Regiment was receiving
for the future operations.
On
5 September, the Regiment prepared to move
in the evening. The first march
unit leaving the area at 2100 hours and the
last march unit at 2340 hours with
the IP at Castelfiorentino. (See overlay
No. 1) (Map Italy, 1/100,000, sheets
106, 112, 113)
Training Area, Vicinity
of Florence, Italy
At
0245 hours, 6 September 1944, the entire
Regiment closed in at the new training
area in the vicinity of Florence after a
motor march of some fifteen miles over
very dusty roads in complete blackout driving. The
Regiment then prepared equipment and supplies
for the near future combat operations. A
quartering party from each Battalion and
each of the companies of the Special
Units was sent out north of Florence to search
for a new assembly area. From this
party, three men were Battle casualties
when an "S" mine was set off, killing
one enlisted man and wounding the Regimental
S-3, Major Warren C. Chapman, and the Headquarters
Commandant, 1st Lt. Edward B. Edwards. Many
mines were found on the roads and houses
blown over the road also trees felled over the
road and mined and booby trapped.
During
the next day the weather was most disagreeable
with heavy rains and so the proposed
move to the new location north of Florence
was called off for the time being. All
during this period of time however, the
Regiment continued to prepare for future
operations, cleaning equipment, hauling
supplies, and collecting mules for the operations through
the mountains. Five enlisted men from
Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion
were killed when their peep hit a mint in
the road. The Regiment received
forty one rotation replacements and two officers during
the period. On this date, 8 September,
the Regiment, less the Service Company
and the Regimental S-1 Section, moved to
the vicinity of Cercina (809777), a
movement of ten miles over very rough and
dusty roads. The Regiment passed
to IP at 2100 hours and closed in at the
new area at 0400 hours, 9 September
1944.
Battle for the Gothic
Line.
[Time flow is not sequential,
hence confusing, in the period 9-11 September
1944.]
Celebrating
Salerno Day, 9 September 1944, the Regiment
was given an informal presentation
of decorations and awards by Major General Charles
L. Bolte, Commanding General of the 34th
Infantry Division. Twenty decorations
and awards were presented by the General,
consisting of the following: 1 Silver
Star, 12 Bronze Stars, 6 Division Citations, and
1 Italian Bronze Medal for Valor, which was
presented to the Regimental Commander,
Colonel William H. Schildroth, for valor
in the liberation of Rome. The
Regiment then moved to the vicinity of Legri, less
the Service Company, Service train and the
Regimental S-1 Section, a distance
of twenty three and one half miles over rough
and very dusty mountain roads and prepared
to attack. (See overlay No. 3, Map,
Italy, 1/50,000) One platoon
of the First Battalion was motorized and
moved in advance of the Regiment and
occupied the first objective of the Regiment,
Hill 520, without opposition. The Third
Battalion then moved up and relieved
this platoon of the First Battalion. The
First Battalion moved to an assembly
area and the Second Battalion moved to the
right flank of the Regimental Area of Legri. Thirty
two enlisted men and three officers,
to be sent to the United States on temporary duty
for a thirty day leave were sent to the 34th
Division Rear on 10 September 1944. On
this date the Service Company and Regimental
S-1 Section moved up to the location
of the Regimental Command Post at Legri,
from the vicinity of Florence. The
entire Regiment was then in a forward
assembly area (See overlay No. 4, Map of
Italy, 1/25,000) preparing to attack
at 0530 hours the morning of 11 September. (See overlay
No. 5, Map of Italy, 1/50,000) The
attack started on time with Battalions
abreast, the First Battalion of the left,
Second Battalion on the right and Third
Battalion in reserve following the First
Battalion. The First Battalion
reached objective Number Eight without opposition and
continued on to objective Number Ten. The
Second Battalion encountered enemy
machine gun fire at 1630 hours but continued
to advance. The First Battalion
encountered thirty enemy in the vicinity of
705922, had a fire fight with the enemy withdrawing
to the north. The First Battalion occupied
the objective Number Ten at 2000 hours and proceeded
northwest to the Corps boundary. Eight
enlisted men of the First Battalion
were wounded in the fire fight previously
mentioned.
The
Second Battalion forward elements were on
their objective Number Ten at 738930
and in contact with the enemy at 2400 hours. The Third
Battalion moved to an assembly area in the
vicinity of 750913 and closed in at
2400 hours 9 September 1944. (Map of Italy
106, I and II)
The
evacuation of the wounded was most difficult. The
mountain trail that was used in following
the troops with an ambulance became unusable. It
took fifteen hours to evacuate a load of
casualties over this trail and through
river beds and narrow trails over the rugged terrain. Partisans
assisted the Medical personnel to guide the ambulances
over these little known trails during the
night.
With
the First and Second Battalions abreast and
the Third Battalion in Reserve, the
Regiment continued the attack with the two leading
Battalions approaching the objective Number
Ten. At 1800 hours, the First
Battalion reported, through the Cannon Company,
that they were drawing sniper fire
and long range machine gun fire. The
Second Battalion was on their objective
(738924) at 1815 hours but drawing machine
gun fire from 739937. At this time
the First Battalion had not reported
in for six hours as all communications were
out but as resistance was light all
along the line, they were believed to be
near their objective. The Second
Battalion was ordered to gain their objective
before dark, outpost it, and patrol to the
north.
Heavy
air support was indicated and this Headquarters
was notified on 11 September that there
would be five hundred fighters and three hundred
bombers over the sector in the next three
days, bombing in our advance in the
Futa Pass region. Four casualties were
reported to have been inflicted on
the First Battalion from enemy mortar fire. At
0730 hours, the Third Battalion was
moving to a new assembly area in the vicinity
of Quaranta. A reconnaissance party
from Regimental Headquarters left at
0840 hours to select a new Command Post location further
forward because communications were very
difficult in spite of the fact that
several relay stations were in use.
In
the morning, Corps G-2 called and reported
that reliable civilian reports indicated
that the enemy was withdrawing generally towards
the north to Bologna, leaving only about
one hundred and fifty men to guard
the passes in a rear guard action. These
reports were later confirmed by prisoners
captured from the 356th German Division. At
1120 hours, the First Battalion was ordered
to move to a new assembly area (See
overlay No. 5) the Second Battalion was ordered
to continue to outpost their objective.
While
the First Battalion was on the move. this
Headquarters received a change in plans
from the Division G-3. Objective Number
Ten was to have been our final objective
with the Regiment then being pinched
out and the 135th Infantry Regiment taking
over this territory. But due
to the change in plans, this Regiment was
to obtain objective Number Eleven tonight,
using vehicles if possible.
On
the morning of 12 September, this Regiment
was to jump off through the 168th Infantry
Regiment, heading for objective Number Fourteen
(See overlay No. 6). The proposed plan
was to march in a column of Battalions.
The
two lead Battalions, the First and the Second,
still in the attack, were now very
much nearer objective Number Eleven than
any elements of the 168th Infantry
Regiment who were supposed to take the objective
and it was believed that this Regiment would
reach the objective before the 168th
Infantry Regiment, making it necessary to pass
through them in the morning if the plans
were not changed in the meantime.
All
during the period the 133rd Infantry Regiment
had been the furthermost forward unit
of the II Corps, which was making the main Fifth
Army effort, in fact, this had been the situation
since the push started. At 1545
hours, the Regimental forward Command Post
closed out and moved to Pimonte, closing
in at 1756 hours. (See overlay No.
6)
The
Third Battalion reported they had picked
up an American aviator that had been
shot down about two months ago and had been
hiding in the hills, aided by friendly
civilians since that time. He also reported
that he had information on enemy defenses
and positions in this sector and it
is suspected that this information would
greatly aid the Regiment in the advance.
At
1800 hours, a Reconnaissance party from Regimental
Headquarters left to search for a more
forward Command Post location, returning
later in the evening with a proposed
Command Post location at Montecuccali.
The
Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion
was called by the Regimental Commander
at 1800 hours, explaining the situation and
also stating that the 168th Infantry
Regiment had bogged down and that the Second
Battalion of this Regiment was going to take
the 168th's objective Number Eleven
and that the Third Battalion was to follow
the Second Battalion. An hour
later, the 168th Infantry Regiment was called asking
them to check on their mortar firing as our
Second Battalion had men on their objective
Number eleven and had been receiving mortar
fire which they thought was from friendly
sources. During the evening, the Cannon
Company moved up by sections in order to
provide continuous support with their
guns. The Chemical mortars, of which
a platoon of each was with the Second
and Third Battalions, also moved up. The Second
Battalion, at 1940 hours, reported that their
troops were past the 96 grid line and
that they had again received friendly artillery fire
but had it stopped. At this time it
was reported that the Regiment on our
right had a Battalion in the rear of our
Second Battalion. Division G-3
was then notified and he then reported that
he ordered the 168th Infantry Regiment
to get out of our way and our troops, meeting light
resistance, continued to advance over extremely
rough terrain towards their objective.
At
2040 hours, 11 September 1944, Division G-3
notified this Regiment that it was
again the furthermost forward unit of the
Fifth Army. Just before midnight
the First Battalion was ordered to make plans
for moving up by motor on 12 September, as
they had been left in their assembly
area for a rest. Cannon Company had one platoon
in position at 754934 and the other
platoon was on the move forward just prior
to midnight. Shortly after midnight,
the Second Battalion again discovered
patrols from the 168th Infantry Regiment
operating in their rear and the division
G-3 was again notified of the same.
[12
September 1944]
The
troops jumped off in the attack from objective
Number Eleven at 0530 hours, 12 September
1944, advancing on objective Number Fourteen (See
overlay No. 6, Map of Italy, 1/25,000, Sheets
98 III, SE, NE). The enemy had
been shelling our proposed Regimental Command
Post but at 0530 hours the shelling
ceased and wire was laid in. Another
report of enemy shelling was received
at 0800 hours with the enemy shelling the
road to Montecuccoli. This shelling
caused two killed and four wounded in Company "K" as
they were on the road at this time. At
0900 hours the forward Command Post
party left Pimonte and closed in on the new
Command Post at Montecuccoli at 1000
hours. The S-1 section and Headquarters Company
Rear party moved from the vicinity of Legri
to the vicinity of Pimonte and closed
in at 1600 hours. The troops were moving
steadily forward in a column of Battalions
with the Second Battalion leading and the
Third Battalion following.
At
1015 hours, the Second Battalion ran into
a minefield covered by machine gun
fire (See overlay No. 6) and suffered four
casualties but immediately began to
deploy and work around the minefield but
were held up as they could not immediately
discover the extent of the minefield and
the enemy resistance was stiffening. The
Third Battalion which was following
the Second Battalion, was ordered to send
a strong combat patrol around the left
flank, feel out the situation and then, if possible,
follow up with the rest of the Third Battalion
and outflank the enemy holding up the
advance of the Second Battalion. The
Second Battalion was to go around to
the right of the minefield and again go north. The
first of the two Battalions, the Second and
the Third, to reach the general line
of advance (Point "X" on overlay
No. 6) was to lead the advance from
that point on.
An
Italian civilian, who claimed he had been
forced to help the enemy lay the minefield,
volunteered to guide the Second Battalion around
the minefield. In the meantime, extra mine
teams and sweepers were sent out to
the two Battalions, as well as bangalores
and prima wire, in case it was found
feasible to blow up the minefield.
Still
another minefield was discovered in the vicinity
of Mongona (See overlay No. 6).
At
1125 hours, the Division Commanding General
called at the Regimental Command Post
and remarked that he was most pleased with
the progress of the Regiment.
The
Third Battalion, at this time, had patrols
as far as the 98 grid line and it was
believed that they could get around the left
flank. Due to the extremely rugged
terrain, the Anti-Tank Company had been in an
assembly area through much of the advance,
moving up as the situation warranted. Two
platoons of this company were sent forward
with picks and shovels to work on the
roads due to the shortage of engineers.
At
1330 hours, the Second Battalion was working
to the right of the minefield and were
advancing but had received enemy small arms
fire. The First Battalion was
ordered to walk to 740948 as the use of trucks was
not feasible due to the poor condition of
the roads. At 1430 hours, four
TOTs [Time on Target, pre-planned artillery
fire] were fired, ten minutes apart,
on known enemy positions in advance of our
troops. An enemy Command Post
was reported, by a civilian, to be at 754995
and another TOT was requested.
Resistance
was increasing and both Battalions were engaged
in frequent fire fights and were receiving
small arms, mortar, machine gun and
self propelled artillery fire, but the advance
continued.
Although
the Regimental Commander thought our reserve
Battalion (1st Bn.) was not needed
forward, despite the fact that we were meeting determined
resistance all day since mid-morning, in
response to a suggestion from the Division
Commander, the First Battalion was ordered to
move by foot to an assembly area at 750962
(See overlay No. 7) (Map of Italy,
1/50,000 Sheet 98 II & III) starting
in the morning at 0530 hours. At
the same time, the attached tank platoon
(Co. A, 757th TD Bn.) was ordered to
stay in place for the night and in the morning
to reconnoiter the routes forward.
In
response to a civilian report mentioned earlier
in the evening, the Assistant S-2 led
a small patrol to investigate a house in
which it was believed the fifteen or
twenty enemy were located (737962). Upon arrival
at the house, the patrol and the enemy became
engaged in a fire fight and upon our
patrol sending for reinforcements, the enemy disengaged
and retired back down into the valley. At
1930 hours, the Regimental Commander
went forward to the Battalions to secure
first hand information of the situation.
At
this time the Cannon Company reported their
new Command Post to be located at 753957
(See overlay No. 7). The Second and
Third Battalions were still moving
forward but very slowly at this time. Rugged
terrain, extremely poor trails and numerous
minefields hampered their advance,
in addition to the fact that the Second Battalion
was still engaged in a fire fight and
the Third Battalion was receiving machine
gun and mortar fire on their left flank in
addition to some artillery fire estimated
to be 105mm. One prisoner from the
1st Company, 334th Fusilier Battalion
was captured at 2000 hours by Company "G",
the forward element of the Second Battalion. Both
advance Battalion were moving slowly
all evening and at 2130 hours they both held
up in place for the night, it being impossible
to advance over the extremely rough
terrain and dangerous trails after nightfall. Vigorous patrolling
to both flanks and to the front was carried
out by both Battalions during the night. Plans
were made to continue the advance at day
break. At 2245 hours, Cannon Company
closed in their new area and were set
up and ready to fire.
[13
September 1944]
On
13 September, at 0550 hours, the First Battalion
was on the move, by foot, to the forward
area. After a preliminary reconnaissance and
after vigorous patrolling throughout the
night, the Second and Third Battalions
were underway, moving forward in a column
of companies, with the Third Battalion
on the left flank with Company "I" in
the point. At 0730 hours, a TOT
was placed on known enemy strongpoints in
this sector at 735019, by all Division
and Corps artillery. The Battalions
then moved slowly forward, hampered
by the fact that all passable trails were mined
and covered with machine gun fire.
At
0900 hours the Third Battalion Commanding
Officer asked for more mine teams as
their leading company, Company "I",
had run into another minefield at 757976. The
Third Battalion was ordered to pull the
lead company back and to allow Company "K" to
swing around to the right flank of
the minefield. The First Battalion,
which was moving up at this time, was
ordered to reconnoiter the route forward
that was used by the Second Battalion
the day previous, as it was planned to put
the First Battalion in the line in
case the Third Battalion could not extricate
itself from the minefield in time to be effective. This
plan, however, proved to be unnecessary
because a couple of civilians were located
to lead the Third Battalion around the minefield
and show the Battalion the most advantageous
route forward.
Meanwhile
the Second Battalion had cleared a path through
the minefield encountered the previous
day, marked it, and then proceeded to move
their forward Command Post forward. At
1020 hours, the Division Commanding
General arrived at the Regimental Command
Post and commented most favorably on
the progress of the Regiment.
A
report was received at 1100 hours that about
twenty enemy had returned to the house
previously mentioned (737962). The
Assistant S-2 again took a patrol,
composed of enlisted men from the Regimental Headquarters
Company I & R (Intelligence and Reconnaissance)
platoon and from the Third Battalion
to investigate the house. Upon approaching
the house the patrol was fired upon
and engaged in a fire fight with the occupants. The
enemy thereupon screened their exit by driving
several Italian women out of the house
into the line of fire. The enemy then retreating,
followed by fire from our patrol, ran into
troops from Company "I",
who, engaging them in a fire fight, killed
several and took four prisoners from
the following enemy organizations: two from
the 5th Company, 754th Infantry Regiment
and two from the 4th Company of the same
Regiment.
At
the same hour, two enemy deserters from the
4th Company, 754th Infantry Regiment,
334th Division were picked up by the Third
Battalion. A TOT was placed on
enemy strongpoints at 1130 hours at 746010
and ten minutes later at 747018. At
1240 hours, the First Battalion was closing behind
the Second Battalion and preparing to pass
through them in the night. The
Third Battalion was receiving heavy machine
gun and small arms fire at 1300 from
927982. The mission of clearing and
weakening this strongpoint was given
to the attached artillery and 4.2 chemical mortar
platoon.
During
the period, 1320 hours to 1330 hours, seven
rounds of estimated 88mm enemy artillery
fire fell in the vicinity of the Regimental
Command Post, three of which were duds. On
about 1350 hours, a enemy pocket was
located at 757991 and was fired upon by our
4.2 mortars and 81mm mortars. Enemy
was seen to break and run from a house at
one point and to enter another house which
was also taken under fire. Companies "E" and "K" were
sent in that direction.
At
about 1600 hours, a patrol from Company "K" was
ambushed by the enemy with the result
that four were killed, six wounded and five missing
in action. A house at this location was reported
by the patrol, to be set up as a strongpoint,
well protected by mines, wire and booby traps
and with fields of fire cut through the trees
by machine gun fire. Company "G",
who later located this same pocket of resistance,
aided the ambushed patrol to retire.
At
1700 hours, the point of the First Battalion
was just behind the Second Battalion
and were to close up and follow the Second Battalion
who was going to push forward as much as
possible before dark. At 0600
hours the next morning, the First Battalion
was to pass through the Second Battalion. All
attached personnel, including the 4.2 mortars and
mine sweepers of the Second Battalion were
to go with the First Battalion. In
the morning the First Battalion was to lead
off, followed by the Second Battalion
who in turn is to be followed by the Third Battalion. Artillery
concentrations for known enemy strongpoints
were planned for just before nightfall. Exact
positions and types of positions, number
of enemy in them and names of enemy units
were given by the captured prisoners
during the day.
The
advance was slow and difficult due to the
lack of trails up the sides of the
mountains. All trails were poor, mined
and covered by machine gun fire from
well prepared enemy strongpoints. As
the Regiment approached the heart of
the Gothic Line, enemy resistance continued
to grow more stubborn and determined
but in spite of these adverse conditions,
our battle wise troops advanced slowly but
steadily.
During
the early evening hours, the Second Battalion
was ordered to maintain pressure on
the enemy all night by probing and pushing
as much as possible. The Third
Battalion was to keep moving until dark and to
start the advance again at dawn. The
First Battalion was to keep up close
behind the Second Battalion, follow them
and to move through or around them
at dawn.
Evacuation
of the wounded was most difficult due to
the rugged terrain. approximately fifty
litter bearers were obtained from the Anti-Tank
Company and thirty from the 109th [Medical]
Collecting Company, which were established
in a litter relay chain for the evacuation
of the casualties. This litter chain
was used for the litter haul of approximately
six miles from the point of casualty to the waiting
ambulances. The Second Battalion Aid
Station, one of the most advanced stations,
was located in a gully approximately two
hundred yards back of the village of
Fresciano. The town being in ruins
because the enemy had blown down every
building in the town. This aid station had
to carry on its work in absolute darkness
and extreme care had to be exercised
because the surrounding area were heavily
mined.
Our
troops received enemy fire all during the
evening of the 13th of September and
during the evening several enemy mortar positions
and enemy artillery positions were
taken under fire by our supporting artillery
with good results. Huge explosions
were observed at a known enemy artillery
position (738038) after our artillery had
placed a concentration on it.
[14
September 1944]
Soon
after daylight on the 14th of September,
the First Battalion started through
the Second Battalion, both Battalions receiving
enemy artillery fire and machine gun
fire. Particularly heavy fire came
from Hill 769 (743997) and the Second
Battalion was ordered to swing over and take
the hill. If the attack on Hill 769
was successful, it was planned for
the Second Battalion to continue to attack
to the north to the left of the First
Battalion. At about 0830 hours, the
platoon of chemical mortars attached
to the Third Battalion was detached and sent
over to the 135th Infantry Regiment
on our right and the remaining platoon was ordered
to work up and around to the right in supporting
range.
At
0930 hours, the Second Battalion reported
that they had a patrol working up Hill
769, the First Battalion reported that they
were receiving heavy artillery fire,
estimated to be 105mm and also heavy machine
gun fire from their right flank. Heavy
mined areas and wire were also encountered
at 749995. At 1000 hours, the remaining
platoon of chemical mortars were detached
and sent to the aid of the Regiment on our
right.
As
the First Battalion approached S. Margherita
(757995) they found increasingly heavy
mortar fire in addition to sniper and machine gun
fire. Heavy artillery also fell upon our
troops and several casualties were
inflicted. Meanwhile, elements of Company "G" had worked
up Hill 769 after raking the strongpoint
at the crest with artillery, mortar
and machine gun fire. About 150 yards
from the crest they encountered a mined
area and from that point engaged in a sharp fight
with the enemy troops holding the hill. After
an exchange of fire a white flag went
up on the hill, seven prisoners were captured
and our patrols pushed on over the
crest of the hill to continue the advance. At
1430 hours, the attached tanks and tank destroyers,
one platoon of each, were ordered to
move forward with the intention of getting
them up to Laiano [Vaiano?] (762983)
and attaching them to the First Battalion in
order that they might be used to support
direct fire whenever possible, although
because of the nature of the terrain, they
would be unable to maneuver. The
Division Commanding General, Major General Charles
L. Bolte, made frequent visits to the forward
Regimental Command Post, and each time
expressed his satisfaction of the progress
made by the Regiment over the rugged
terrain encountered.
Company "C" was
sent to take Hill 791 (747005) because our
troops had been receiving heavy fire
from that point. Upon leaving Hill
769, they immediately became engaged
in another exchange of fire with the enemy
and started to fight their way up to Hill
791. Company "A" was ordered
to work around Terenzana to aid Company "C",
by attacking the hill from the east.
Meanwhile, Company "E" received
a counter-attack, coming from the west
and southwest, with an estimated one to two
hundred enemy in the attack. The
enemy attacked with hand grenades and small arms
fire, shouting and firing indiscriminately. Our
troops fell back a few yards and then
mowed them down as they came on in waves,
running and falling over their own
dead. The enemy was successfully beaten
off, losing heavily, but a few of them
managed to remain in holes and our troops
had to pry them out at close range. Artillery
fire was immediately brought to bear
on the enemy, however, some of the artillery fell
close to our troops, inflicting casualties.
Our
troops had fought hard all day and had engaged
in bitter exchanges of fire. Our
advance was still impeded by heavily mined areas,
wire, and fortified strongpoints.
During
the evening, the First and Second Battalions
continued to move slowly forward, meeting
heavy and almost fanatical opposition and numerous
enemy were in front of them. Company "B" moved
up above S. Margherita to protect our
right flank from infiltration as there was considerable
distance between us and 135th Infantry Regiment
on our right.
Defensive
and harassing fire were planned for the night
and at 2045 hours, the Second Battalion
reported they were still engaged in a fire
fight and that they were working up the crest
of Hill 769 where they ran into protective
wire and heavily mined areas. Twenty
to twenty five casualties were inflicted
upon the Battalion, most of them fatal. Numerous
enemy were within hand grenade distance beyond
the protective wire but the enemy were
well dug in and difficult to remove. Toward midnight,
however, the front was fairly quiet.
Eight
prisoners were captured during the day by
the First Battalion from units as follows: two
from the 7th Company, 754th Infantry
Regiment, 334th Infantry Division and six
from the 8th Company of the same Regiment
and Division. (See overlay No. 8 for positions
of troops)
Evacuation
of the wounded was becoming more difficult
as the front advanced in the mountains. One
hundred and sixty five litter bearers were
now being used over a litter relay chain
of seven and one half miles. Lines
of evacuation were constantly being reconnoitered
but most of the small roads or paths
were under direct enemy observation and therefore
received heavy artillery shelling.
The
supply problem in the mountains was also
a major problem. As with the
evacuation of casualties, the supply routes
were also under observation of the
enemy and also received much artillery fire. At
this time, one hundred and seventy
two mules and two hundred and forty Italian
mule skinners were being used. Both
Italian and American mules were being
used to haul the "K" rations, ammunition
and water and various other supplies
up to the front line troops. Four to five
mules were lost per night due to falling
off the steep cliffs and narrow trails
in the dark.
[15 September 1944]
At
0600 hours, the morning of the 15th of September,
the First and Second Battalions again
started to move with the Third Battalion
moving up close behind the First Battalion;
both forward Battalions immediately received
small arms and heavy machine-gun fire. The
tanks and tank destroyers moved to
Collina (773963) at 0930 hours but the road
west from Laiano could not be used
because it was heavily mined. Throughout
the morning the Second Battalion continued
to meet very heavy opposition from
close quarters, the First Battalion continued
the attempt to move but progress was
very slow and costly. All trails were mined
and booby trapped and the enemy had used
demolitions in many places.
Shortly
after 1200 hours, the Commanding General
of the II Corps, Major General Geoffrey
Keyes, and the Commanding General of the
34th Infantry Division, Major General
Charles Bolte, called at the forward Regimental
Command Post and stated they were most pleased
with the progress of the Regiment,
especially over the rough terrain and against such
stiff opposition.
Artillery
had been used continuously all day and in
the afternoon our supporting artillery
fire increased in intensity. Our supporting artillery
and also Division artillery were used in
concentrations requested from the Chemical
mortars attached to the Regiment on our right. Fifteen
minute concentrations were placed by the
Chemical mortars every hour starting
at 1615 hours and until 2015 hours on the following
points: 746003, 747006, and 748008. Our
Cannon Company also fired ten rounds
per minute for 15 minutes on the same targets.
A
coordinated attack, preceded by an intense
artillery concentration and a rolling
barrage was planned for the First and Second Battalions
and at 1705 hours they jumped off in the
attack. Companies "E" and "G" attacked
to the north and northwest, Company "B" proceeding toward
Terenzana (754005) [900m ESE of Hill 810]
which they occupied an hour later while Company "C" became
engaged in a heavy fire fight at 744997.
At
1800 hours our positions were as indicated
on overlay Number 9. Our troops
had met stiff opposition throughout the day
and had suffered seventy five casualties
but still heavier casualties were inflicted
on the enemy and we had advanced in
the famed Gothic Line.
During
the early evening hours, telephone conversations
were held between the Regimental Commander
and the three Battalion Commanders and plans
for the coming morning attack were made. It
was planned to send the Third Battalion
around to our extreme right flank and for
them to attack to the north. Company "K" was
to proceed to Terenzana immediately
so as to be prepared and in position for
the early morning attack as the point
of the Battalion. Companies "A" and "B" were
to continue the attack on Hill 791
[350m SSE of Hill 810] during the evening
and if not successful by nightfall,
were to continue on in the morning. Late
in the evening Company "C" was
still engaged in a heavy fire fight and could
not move forward. Company "G" was
just short of the crest of Hill 672 at 2150 hours
and patrols were sent forward of that position. Company "E" was about
two hundred yards behind Company "G" and
an enemy machine gun was firing on
them from a position about one hundred and
fifty yards west and between the two
companies but troops from these companies
silenced the gun in short order.
At
midnight Company "K" had cleared
S. Margherita and were heading for
Terenzana. The Second Battalion was
still in a fierce fire fight and Companies "C" and "B" were
moving slowly up the hill. Only four prisoners
were captured, all by the Second Battalion,
from the 7th Company, 754th Regiment
of the 334th Infantry Division. Our
casualties were heavy, about ninety
wounded and killed, but at the same time
we had inflicted severe casualties
upon the enemy.
The
evacuation of the wounded was still a major
problem and more litter bearers were
obtained from all available sources in the
Regiment, especially the Service Company
and the Anti-Tank Company. A new route of
evacuation was opened by using the main highway
running into S. Margherita, regardless
of the fact that the highway was under direct artillery
observation. The litter bearers were
worn out from almost continuous twenty
four hour duty and the litter bearer problem
was becoming acute.
[16
September 1944]
At
daylight, on the morning of the 16th of September,
a combat patrol from Company "F" was
to go to wipe out an enemy strongpoint at 741991
and elements of Company "G" were
to go to Hill 662. At 2330 hours
a small enemy counter-attack was launched,
estimated to be about twenty five men
in strength, which was beaten off by Company "E" by using
hand grenades. At daylight the Third
Battalion jumped off in the attack
with Company "K" in the point but
almost immediately ran into enemy machine
gun fire which slowed them down. The
First Battalion also moved off but
ran into very heavy resistance from their
objectives.
At
0725 hours, a small forward Regimental Command
Post group left Montecucolli to establish
a new forward Command Post at Corsica (762971). The
First Battalion was in a fierce fire fight
at 0830 hours and enemy positions in
front of them were as heavily fortified as
in Cassino. Positions were protected
by wire, mined areas, and every approach
was covered by machine gun fire. Bunkers
were well constructed, buttressed with
heavy timbers covered with about three or four
feet of rocks and earth.
Because
the Regiment did not have a Battalion in
reserve, it was hoped that the Second
Battalion could clean up the opposition in
front of them but this could not be
accomplished however, as the opposition was
very strong and the fighting was still going
on fiercely at 1000 hours. During
this opposition encounter, the Second Battalion
S-3, Captain Hugh S. Jacobs, was wounded
and evacuated.
However,
the First Battalion had been able to get
two tank destroyers in a forward position
and they were supporting by direct fire. At
1030 hours the First Battalion encountered
another heavily mined area between
them and their objective and reconnaissance
was instituted with the objective of
finding a way of getting through or around
the area.
Terenzano
had erroneously been reported as captured
after a combat patrol from the Third
Battalion had entered the town in the early morning
hours and after engaging the enemy had been
forced to withdraw. But at 1400
hours, The Third Battalion jumped off in
a coordinated attack, preceded by an
artillery preparation, to take Hill 582 upon which
the town of Terenzano is located.
The
Second Battalion, which had been engaged
in bitter fighting and had not moved,
prepared an exceptionally heavy artillery
preparation and moved off in a co-ordinated
attack at 1715 hours. At 1800 hours
the Second Battalion was moving slowly
against opposition which had increased
considerably during the last twenty four
hours.
Enemy
artillery, mortar and machine gun fire had
increased in intensity on our front
but the Third Battalion had made favorable advances
in face of slightly lessened resistance on
their front. All during the day
our troops had been engaged continuously
with a very stubborn enemy, who at
times, fought with near-fanatic ferocity. Their positions
were well placed, well protected by wire,
mines and machine gun cross fire and
were impossible to take without heavy casualties
to our troops.
At
1830 hours, Company "A" received
a counter-attack [which] was repulsed
by bringing down intense artillery, mortar
and heavy machine gun fire upon the
attacking enemy. Almost at the same
time, Company "B", on the
other flank, was hit by a counter-attack
which also was repulsed, inflicting
casualties upon the enemy. Later in
the evening, Company "F" was
counter-attacked, Company "G" was
counter-attacked and Company "E" was
counter-attacked, all within an hour and
a half. As our supporting Battalion
of Artillery, the 151st Field Artillery Battalion, was
on the move forward at this time, artillery
fire was brought to bear by the 125th
Field Artillery Battalion, through the Division
Artillery, and was very effective. All
counter-attacks were repulsed and no ground was
lost but casualties were inflicted on our
tired, hard fighting troops.
At
1950 hours, Major General Bolte, the Division
Commanding General, in a telephone
conversation with the Regimental Commander, ordered
him to hold the Third Battalion in place
until the other units of the Regiment
had a chance to clean out the left flank,
as by this time the Third Battalion
was considerably ahead and it was thought
that their flank might be endangered. Company "A" had
been temporarily stopped at 2000 hours,
because of fierce opposition, Company "B" was progressing
very slowly under heavy fire but Company "C" was
meeting less resistance and their progress
was more favorable. At midnight the Regimental
Commander gave orders to the Battalion Commanders
for the planned offensive of the next
day. The First Battalion was to attack
to the north and occupy Hill 810, the
Second Battalion was to take Hills 662
and 622 and clean out the enemy, the Third
Battalion to occupy Hill 505, all Battalions
to move at daylight or as soon thereafter
as possible. All Battalions were
to operate very strong and active patrols throughout
the night maintaining pressure upon the enemy. At
the same hour the 151st Field Artillery
Battalion closed in their new area and were
in position to give supporting artillery
fire.
For
the preceding twenty four hours, this command
has been in continuous close contact
with the enemy, engaging in very fierce fighting
and repulsing numerous and frequent enemy
counter-attacks. During the day
our attached tanks and tank destroyers had
knocked out seven enemy bunkers and
our troops had again inflicted severe casualties upon
the enemy. But due to the enemy's extremely
well placed, well fortified and well
protected strongpoints, our own tired, dirty
and depleted troops also had suffered
with approximately seventy five casualties
for the day. (See overlay No. 10 for
positions of troops at 2400 hours,
16 September 1944)
[17
September 1944
On
the morning of 17 September 1944, all three
Battalions again started to advance. The
enemy immediately launched a strong counter-attack,
an estimated two companies against Company "E". A fierce
battle ensued at close quarters with many
hand grenades being used by the enemy
in addition to rifle grenades, machine gun,
mortar and self propelled artillery
fire. The counter-attack was repulsed,
both sides losing heavily, but our
troops remained in close contact and the fighting
continued.
The
fire power of the Regiment was strengthened
by a platoon of the 84th Chemical Mortar
Battalion and the 168th Infantry Regiment's Cannon
Company being attached to the Third Battalion. But
to some extent the fire power of the
Regiment was reduced because the allotment of
81mm mortar ammunition had been reduced to
five hundred rounds per day. The
Regiment had previously been firing approximately
1200 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition
per day so the curtailment of this ammunition did
make a decided difference.
Throughout
the day the enemy artillery and mortars had
been very active, in fact, in spots
the enemy laid in more artillery fire than this
Regiment had ever experienced in all their
contact with the enemy. At about
1200 hours, two concentrations of mortar
and artillery fire, of fifty or sixty
rounds, landed within a ten minute period
on Hill 628. At 1300 hours, Hill
810 was captured by the First Battalion and prisoners
were captured. The Third Battalion,
following the 135th Infantry Regiment's
flank, attacked Hill 602 from the east. At
this time the Battalions were requested
to use the Cannon Companies more frequently
because our attached artillery had been and
was firing continuously, in fact they
were so busy they could not handle all the fire
missions requested of them.
In
an effort to get the road running north from
S. Margherita open for our armor, additional
Engineers were requested from Division but
it was impossible to secure them.
At
1301 hours, another concentration of enemy
mortar fire fell in our sector at 747971,
two hundred rounds in five minutes, while
heavy harassing fires fell continuously,
making it most difficult to maintain communications.
Again at 1515 hours, the Second Battalion
was engaged in a fierce fire fight
and the Third Battalion was progressing slowly. The First
Battalion, fighting on Hill 810, had captured
the hill but the enemy immediately
counter-attacked, driving the First Battalion
off the crest of the hill. Severe
casualties were inflicted on both sides. The First
Battalion immediately reorganized and attacked
again. At 1615 hours, Hill 810
was in our possession after a fierce fight,
by Companies "A" and "B" and
more prisoners were captured. During
this engagement the First Battalion
Commanding Officer, Major Woodrow M. Dumont,
was seriously wounded and the Battalion
Executive Officer, Major Merton E. Church,
assumed command. (See overlay No. 11
for check points)
A
co-ordinated Division Attack was planned
for the morning of the 18th of September
with the 135th Infantry Regiment and our
Third Battalion jumping off at 0530
hours. Preceded by an artillery preparation,
the Third Battalion was to take Hill 606
and continue to attack northwest, the
First Battalion to remain in place until
the Second Battalion could disengage. After
a protest to the Division Commander
by the Regimental Commander, in which it
was stated that our Second Battalion
was heavily engaged with the enemy and in
all probability would remain so for
several days to come, it was decided to hold
the first Battalion in place until 1100 hours
on the morning of the 18th of September.
This plan, of course, would depend on the
progress of the 135th Infantry Regiment
(See overlay for proposed plan of attack)
Our
troops were still engaged in heavy fighting
as darkness fell with very little progress
having been made.
Just
before dark, Colonel William S. Schildroth,
the Regimental Commander, went forward
to confer with the Battalion Commanders on
plans for the coming day. On
his return trip, at about 2115 hours, his
peep stalled about four or five hundred
yards from the Regimental Forward Command
Post. The Colonel and his radio operator
started to walk the balance of the
way to the Command Post, leaving the driver
with the vehicle. In the darkness,
they took the wrong fork of the trail, strayed
into a minefield and both the colonel and
the radio operator were killed as the
result of setting off a Schu-mine with a
prepared detonation charge under it. The
terrific explosion was heard in the Command
Post but the bodies were not found until
daylight due to the difficulty of getting
through the minefield. Mine teams were
delayed in arriving at the location
and as a result it was not sure it was the Colonel
and his radio operator until dawn, when the
bodies were found. Until then,
there had been a faint possibility that the
two had merely become lost in the hill
surrounding the Command Post. Division Headquarters
was immediately notified and the Regimental
Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel Sarratt
T. Hames, was ordered to take command of the
Regiment. This he did, arriving at
the Forward Command Post about midnight.
Prisoners
captured during the day totalled fourteen
of which thirteen were captured by
the First Battalion. Twelve of the
prisoners being from the 2nd Company,
334th Fusilier Battalion and one from the 1st
Company, 334th Replacement Battalion and
the other, captured by Headquarters
Company, from the 4th Company, 754th Regiment,
334th Infantry Division.
So
with another day of continuous hard fighting
to crack the Gothic Line, no appreciable
gains were made.
[18 September 1944]
Preceded
by a heavy artillery preparation, the Third
Battalion jumped off into the attack
at 0530 hours, 18 September 1944. At
the same hour, the Second Battalion
spotted enemy troops and it appeared as though
they were forming for a counter-attack. Artillery
was brought to bear on the enemy and
an attack was foiled although an exchange
of fire continued. The Third
Battalion continued moving forward and at
0750 hours Company "I" was
on Hill 606, Company "L" was held
up by a minefield at 759017. At
0825 hours, the 135th Infantry Regiment on
our right, reported that their troops
on Hill 751 were receiving fire from the
eastern slopes of Hill 606 so it was then
evident that the Third Battalion did
not have complete control of the hill.
Due
to casualties, the First Battalion had lost
three Company Commanders as the Battalion
was heavily engaged with the enemy. The First
Battalion was not yet in complete command
of Hill 810 at 0900 hours as had been
previously reported, but they were receiving
artillery fire with no small arms fire.
Fighting continued throughout the morning with
no appreciable progress being made. During
the early part of the afternoon, plans
were instituted for a ight attack to be made
by Companies "C" and "K",
who were attached to the Second Battalion
for that purpose. (See plan of
attack No. 2) Tanks, tank destroyers
and chemical mortars were attached
to the Second Battalion to support the attack,
as well as extra mine teams.
At
1530 hours, Colonel Gustav J. Braun, Division
Chief of Staff reported to the Regimental
Command Post to take command of the Regiment.
Continuous
contact was maintained with the enemy throughout
the afternoon and at times sharp fire
fights [were] breaking out.
At
1745 hours the Forward Command Post moved
to Margherita (757995), closing in
the new location at 1910 hours. (See
overlay No. 12) At 1840 hours,
Company "B" repulsed an enemy counter-attack
on their left flank. At 1900
hours, Company "K" discovered the
enemy in strength in front of them
and the enemy attempting to infiltrate between them
and Company "B". Fighting
at close quarters ensued with many hand grenades
being used on both sides. Both companies
sent out strong combat patrols to flush
the enemy from the draws between and in front
of them, however Company "K" still
had enemy in strength in front of them. Due
to this situation, Company "K" could
not disengage and start the attack
west without leaving a force to hold the
position and protect the companies'
withdrawal. This was taken into account
by the Regimental Commander and it
was decided to postpone the time of the attack
until the situation could be cleared. (See
overlay No. 12) At 2250 hours, it was
decided to leave one platoon of riflemen
as protection for the machine guns
and that the planned attack would go on as
scheduled. This would leave approximately
80 men for the attack with Company "K". The companies
reported that they could prepare their companies
and be at the line of departure at
0300 hours, so at 2345 hours the Regimental Commander
reported to the Division Commander that the
attack would jump off at 0300 hours
with the artillery preparation starting at
0100 hours.
At
midnight the front was comparatively quiet
with only sporadic firing being engaged. The
positions of our troops were as indicated
on overlay No. 12. Four prisoners
were captured during the day, all from the
1st Company, 334th Reserve Battalion. Three
were captured by Company "I",
one by Company "B".
Casualties
for the day were fairly heavy, but the litter
routes were changed to converge in
the town of S. Margherita in which the patients
were treated before being evacuated by the
clearing stations. The treatment
of the patients was difficult because of
the enemy laying in concentrations
of artillery and mortar.
One
hundred infantry replacements were received
during the early evening hours and
were turned over to the Kitchen trains to
be escorted to their respective companies.
[19
September 1944]
In
the early morning hours of 19 September the
151st Field Artillery Battalion notified
this Headquarters that they received permission
to fire again as did the British 5.5s, supporting
artillery for this command. Both
units had previously been ordered to cease firing
because friendly fire was falling in the
area of our troops. These units
had not been at fault however, so they were
granted permissions to resume firing. In
the meantime the two attacking companies,
Companies "C" and "K" were
preparing for the coming attack. Company "K" was
reported to be about forty five minutes late
so Company "C" was ordered
to hold up so as to enable the two companies
to jump off together. At 0430
hours, Company "K" reported they
were at the line of departure and Company "C" crossed
the line at the same time.
Spasmodic
firing continued throughout the night and
at 0515 hours the first objective was
reached by the two attacking companies with light
opposition encountered but they did draw
some mortar, machine gun and small
arms fire. A short time later Company "C" had
been shelled off objective Number 1
(See overlay No. 12, 18 September) and reorganized
preparatory to going back up to the objective. However Company "K" held
on to their objective and at 0600 hours reported
that they had captured sixteen prisoners
on Hill 662. At 0730 hours, Company "K" was
again prepared for the attack and pushed
on to the north followed by Companies "E" and "G". At
0750 hours, twenty four prisoners were
brought in and by 1000 hours our troops had
Hill 769 and were directing fire on
Hill 791. All during the afternoon
prisoners were brought back from the
forward positions and it appeared that due
to the number of prisoners captured
that the enemy resistance was beginning to break.
During
the afternoon plans were made for a night
attack on Ridge 810. It was felt
that if we could take this hill it would
save us many casualties as the enemy
had the commanding ground with excellent observation. This
attack was to be made by the First Battalion supported
by fire from the Third Battalion and the
main effort being made by the troops
of Companies "A" and "B" which
had been combined into one company
due to the high casualties. H-hour
was to be at 0400 hours the following
morning.
Company "K",
which had been attached to the Second Battalion
for the attack of the previous night,
was returned to the Third Battalion control
in the afternoon. During the afternoon
it was decided to organize flame-thrower
teams, as it was felt that these weapons
could be utilized with good results
on enemy bunkers and pill boxes which were most
difficult to liquidate by other means. Each
team was to consist of five men; the
operator, assistant operator, one non-commissioned
officer and two Chemical engineers,
all men to carry grenades and the non-commissioned
officer to be armed with a sub-machine gun.
In the meantime, plans were reached
for the night attack, strong combat patrols were
sent out to reconnoiter the objectives and
if the patrols reported "no contact" upon
their return, the objectives would be occupied
during the night, thus making an attack
in force unnecessary. On or about 2330 hours,
all patrols had returned, reporting no physical
contact with the enemy on Hills 701,
748, and 810 but on Hills 701 and 810 they
had heard sounds of voices, digging
and vehicular movement. As a result
it was decided that an attack was necessary,
and so plans were completed for the
attack to go as planned at 0400 hours.
During
the day we had gained some ground, our objectives
being prominent terrain features to
the west from which the enemy had excellent
observation and had been causing us considerable
trouble. Our captured prisoner
total had mounted, the total for the day
being seventy five which included seven
wounded which had been evacuated. Company "K" captured
a total of forty nine, Company "F" fifteen,
Company "E" three, and Headquarters
Company Third Battalion one from the following
enemy units as listed:
15
- Hq. Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
1
- 1st Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
3
- 2nd Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
1
- 3rd Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
1
- 4th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
22
- 5th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
2
- 6th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
9
- 7th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
2
- 8th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
3
- 13th Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
4
- 1st Company, Anti-Tank Bn., 334 Inf. Div.
4
- 5th Battery, 334th Artillery Regt., [334
Inf. Div.]
1
- 3rd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334 Inf.
Div.]
The
evacuation of the wounded was now not quite
as difficult as previously because
the relay litter route was considerably shortened. However
the litter bearers were practically exhausted
because they were working day and night
evacuating the patients over this most difficult terrain. A
litter squad was relieved occasionally but
this could not be accomplished as often
as necessary due to the shortage of squads
and the length of the litter haul.
One
hundred Infantry replacements were received
and processed. Seventy were forwarded
to the First Battalion to be sent forward
at once, and thirty to the Second Battalion
kitchen train. Nine replacement
officers were also received and assigned. (See
overlay No. 13 for position of troops)
[20 September 1944]
All
during the night and early morning hours
of 20 September, the front was comparatively
quiet with intermittent fire falling throughout the
Regimental sector. During the early
morning hours a light rain started
to fall, continuing until after day light. The
units making the 0400 attack were delayed
somewhat and did not cross the line of departure
until approximately 0420 hours.
An
hour and a half later, Company "A" was
on Hill 748 [200m SE of Hill 810] and the balance
of the Battalion was shoving off for Hill
810. At 0630 hours, the First
Battalion requested increased artillery fire
on Hill 810. The units moved
forward slowly over the rough terrain against
light enemy resistance, Company "B" taking
prisoners on the advance on Hill 810. While
the First Battalion was advancing, the Second
and Third Battalions held in place
with the Third Battalion supporting the First
Battalion by fire and with both Battalions
patrolling vigorously and extensively. At
0945 hours, the First Battalion called for
heavy artillery fire on 740008 [il
Gallo, Hill 622] as their Out Post reported
enemy troops forming at that point
for a possible counter-attack. At 1010
hours an enemy Out Post on Hill 810
was spotted and artillery was brought to
bear, a fire started immediately from
a direct hit on the object.
An
Italian civilian, picked up by our troops,
gave locations of five enemy Out Posts
and three enemy strongpoints so TOTs were
placed by our artillery on each location. Enemy
resistance continued throughout the
morning and at 1115 hours, Company "A" was
engaged in a fire fight with an estimated
two platoons of the enemy from Hill 807,
while machine guns from the same location
kept a steady fire on Company "B". Due
to the determined resistance from this
Hill, it was decided that a part of the
combined "A and "B" companies
should attack the Hill while the balance
of the unit continued to advance on Hill
810. Heavy mortar barrages were
placed on both hills because at this time
our troops were too close to use artillery. At
1405 hours, Company "B" was pinned
down to some extent by self propelled
artillery fire from the vicinity of 732119. At
the same time our attached tanks and tank
destroyers had knocked out several
enemy strongpoints by direct fire on the
eastern slopes of Hill 810. They
continued firing throughout the afternoon, doing
excellent work despite drawing heavy artillery
fire from enemy guns attempting to
knock them out.
Operational
Instructions No. 89 from Headquarters 34th
Infantry Division were received and
were as follows: 34th Division continues attack
at 0600 hours tomorrow morning; 168th Infantry
Regiment goes through the left flank
of 135th Infantry Regiment and attacks northwest; 135th
Infantry Regiment continues to attack north;
133rd Infantry Regiment continues to
attack north.
The
platoon of the 84th Chemical Mortars attached
to this Regiment was detached as was
the Cannon company of the 168th Infantry
Regiment. Plans were immediately
prepared for the attack in the morning with
the Third Battalion to attack north
along the Regimental right boundary with the
First Battalion on the left flank, the Second
Battalion was to clean out pockets
of enemy resistance to the west. (See
Operational Instruction No. 22)
If
the attack succeeded, this Regiment would
be squeezed out of action in two or
three days and then revert to Division Reserve.
Throughout
the day the Second Battalion had been probing
with strong combat patrols and at 1830
one patrol returned from Hill 642 after
engaging in a fire fight with the enemy. The
patrol captured four prisoners and
disengaged because they were greatly outnumbered. During the
evening, the Regimental Commander relieved
the First Battalion Commander of his
command and the Regimental Executive Officer,
Lt. Colonel Sarratt T. Hames was given
the command for the proposed attack of
the next day. By midnight all plans
had been completed, reconnaissance
made and all preparations completed for the
jump-off at 0600 hours in the morning.
The
positions of our troops had not changed appreciably
during the last twenty-four hours but
we had engaged the enemy throughout the period
with stiff fire fights and active patrolling. A
total of fourteen prisoners were captured
throughout the day by the following companies:
five by Company "B", one by Company "E",
four by Company "G", and
four by Company "A". The
prisoners were from enemy units as indicated:
3
- 2nd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334 Inf.
Div.]
1
- 1st Replacement Company, 334 Inf. Div.
(Evac)
2
- 2nd Company, 754th Regt., 334 Inf. Div.
4
- 1st Company, 334th Reserve Bn., [334 Inf.
Div.]
4
- 4th Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334 Inf.
Div.]
The
S-1 Section and Regimental Headquarters Rear
Detachment moved to a new Command Post
site in the town of Barberino and closed
in at 1600 hours.
[21
September 1944]
Again
the night was comparatively quiet until 0455
hours on the morning of 21 September
1944, at which time Company "A"'s
forward elements on Hill 810 were receiving
a counter-attack from an undetermined
number of enemy and were forced to withdraw
to Hill 791. Casualties were
inflicted on both sides, Company "A" suffering
two men killed and one wounded. At
0620 hours the Third Battalion jumped off
in the attack, H-hour being 0600 hours. The
First Battalion was also late in crossing
the line of departure and at 0630 hours Company "A" jumped off
but Company "B" was pinned down
by fire and unable to move. Company "A" immediately
ran into determined resistance and the Battalion
attack bogged down and the attempted
advance was halted. The troops then re-organized
and at 0830 hours, after a ten minute artillery preparation,
the two attacking companies resumed the advance
but again the battalion was pinned
down by fire coming from their left rear, generally
in the vicinity of 736002. The Second Battalion
was then ordered to send out strong
combat patrols to clean out that pocket of enemy
so as to enable the First Battalion to advance.
Meanwhile the Third Battalion was advancing
fairly well, meeting some resistance, mostly
machine gun fire and by 1000 hours their
forward element, Company "I",
was above the 02 grid line and had knocked
out several machine gun nests. At
the same time the Second Battalion had six
strong patrols out to the west and
were working over the pocket of resistance
holding back the First Battalion. They
had captured three prisoners and had neutralized
the enemy fire in that sector. The
First Battalion then resumed the advance
but were still receiving extensive heavy
fire.
In
the early part of the afternoon, Company "A" ran
into extensive mine fields and wire
on the eastern slopes of Hill 807. Casualties
were suffered and the advance again
held up temporarily.
At
about 1500 hours, Major General Bolte, the
34th Division Commander arrived at
the Forward Command Post and conferred with
the Regimental Commander and then left
for the First Battalion Command Post to
secure a better view of the situation.
During
the afternoon it was decided to put Company "C" in
the line in order to lend greater strength
to the advance of the First Battalion and
so a platoon from Company "F" occupied
the positions of Company "C" on
Hill 791.
The
attached tanks and tank destroyers performed
exceptionally well, knocking out bunkers
and strongpoints with direct fire and raising havoc
with the enemy infantry. According
to reports from captured prisoners,
the tanks and tank destroyers kept them pinned
down continuously throughout the day.
They stated that they could not move, even
to eat without having one of our direct fire
weapons dropping a shell in among them
and further added that when our tank destroyers
did cease firing and they could lift
their heads, our Infantry was upon them with
hand grenades. An Officer prisoner
stated that they had very heavy casualties
today, and when taken prisoner, he had many
severely wounded who had to be left
behind, but our Medics took care of them
and picked them up.
At
1635 hours, the Third Battalion knocked out
two enemy machine gun nests and two
Anti-Aircraft guns located at check point
Number 2 (See overlay No. 14, Map of
Italy, 1/25,000, sheets 98 III, NE, SE) but had
not taken prisoners, all enemy personnel
had been killed on their positions
by our hand grenades. Meanwhile our
First Battalion had been moving steadily
forward but had been forced to follow mine
sweepers through the mined areas. At
1840 hours, both Hills 807 and 810 were secure
in our hands and Company "C" had
captured over fifty prisoners.
During
the day and early evening, the Third Battalion
was advancing without much opposition
and was abreast of their objective (See
overlay No. 14) but to the east of it. However,
they would continue to advance after
dark, cutting across to occupy the objectives and
continue to the northwest with Company "I" and
endeavor to cut off the road running
south from Montepiano (See overlay No. 14)
and set up a road block.
Enemy
strongpoints encountered were bypassed and
left for the First Battalion, coming
up from the south, to clean out. Prisoners
were being brought in all day and a
total of seventy five were captured during
the day of which three were officers. Company "A" captured
sixty nine, Second Battalion five,
and Company "E" one from the following units
as indicated:
1
- 1st Company, 755th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
1
- 1st Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
3
- 4th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
1
- 8th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
21
- 1st Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
15
- 2nd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
29
- 4th Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
4
- Hq, Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
Evacuation
were light for the day with a total of twenty
four, [considering] the action encountered
and the type of terrain fighting over.
Three officers consisting of one Captain
and two First Lieutenants were transferred
to the Regiment as replacements.
[22
September 1944]
The
Third Battalion, in the early morning hours
of 22 September, continued their advance
along the lines as planned. They met
no resistance except for scattered
small arms and intermittent self propelled
artillery fire along the trails in their
line of advance and at 0400 hours they
were at Prati (749025). The Second
Battalion area had been quiet throughout
the night and at daylight they sent out strong combat
patrols to the west. The First Battalion
was on the move as scheduled and advanced
along Ridge 791. At 0900 hours a patrol
from the Second Battalion returned
from Hill 528 and reported no contact with
the enemy as all positions on the hill
were vacated. Another patrol, returning
from Hill 642, had engaged the enemy and
captured seven prisoners. At 1200 hours,
a report from the Air Out Post stated that three
enemy tanks were spotted at 743026 and slightly
to the northwest of that point, had
observed enemy infantry, accompanied by three vehicles. Both
targets were taken under fire by our artillery. Still another
patrol returned, from Hill 662 (742001). They
had made no contact with the enemy
but had discovered an unarmed [unmanned(?)] machine
gun position, many Schu-mines ready to be
placed, and great piles of barbed wire. Shortly
after 1200 hours, contact was made by our troops
with elements of the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron who had been moving up the
Fourth Corps boundary on our left flank. At
1300 hours, two enemy tanks were reported
observed at 746015. Our supporting artillery
was immediately brought to bear and also
our attached tank destroyers moved
up to engage them.
A
message from the 168th Infantry Regiment
on our right flank, transmitted through
Division G-3, was received at 1400 hours
and reported approximately thirty five
enemy on Hill 845 (753030) and the division
G-3 deemed it advisable to change the boundary
between the two Regiments so as to
enable a company from our Third Battalion
to go up and clean out the hill because
by this time the 168th Infantry Regiment was
considerably north of that point. (See
overlay No. 15 for boundary changes) Company "L" was
sent on
A message
from the 168th Infantry Regiment on our right
flank, transmitted through Division G-3,
was received at 1400 hours and reported approximately
thirty five enemy on Hill 845 (753030) and
the division G-3 deemed it advisable to change
the boundary between the two Regiments so
as to enable a company from our Third Battalion
to go up and clean out the hill because by
this time the 168th Infantry Regiment was
considerably north of that point. (See overlay
No. 15 for boundary changes) Company "L" was
sent on this mission, because at this time
Company "I" was on the eastern
part of our objective with Company "L" slightly
to the northwest of them.
During
the afternoon, the Second Battalion was ordered
to disengage one company to be used as a
Regimental reserve and assemble near Corte
(753998). Up
to this time all three Battalions had been
constantly on the line engaging the enemy.
At 1530 hours, Company "I" captured
Hill 918 on the eastern half of the objective
and also captured several prisoners.
During
the day resistance had lightened all along
the line and so it was decided to abandon
the plan for the road block south of Montepiano
as had been planned for the Third Battalion.
New plans called for the Third Battalion
to send strong patrols up the east side of
the road running northwest to the town of
Montepiano, and, if the resistance proved
to be not too strong, to enter and occupy
the town. the First Battalion was to execute
the same plan on the west side of the road,
while a motorized patrol from the Regimental
I & R platoon was to enter the town via
the road. As part of the proposed plan, the
Second Battalion was to outpost the town
of Rimondeto and generally along the 995
northing line and to prepare to withdraw
the balance of the Battalion to be used as
the Regimental reserve.
During
the evening, the front was again comparatively
quiet except in the sector of Company "C" who
were engaged in a fire fight on Hill 817.
Resistance was considerably lighter throughout
the day and our troops gained considerable
territory considering the nature of the terrain.
Large stores of enemy equipment were captured
as well as a total of thirty two prisoners.
Sixteen prisoners were captured by Company "B",
seven by Company "A", seven by Company "E" and
two by Company "I", from the enemy
units as follows:
4 -
1st Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th Inf.
Div.]
10 - 2nd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
1 - 3rd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
2 - 4th Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
4 - 1st Company, 334th Medics, [334th Inf.
Div.]
4 - 2nd Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
5 - 6th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
2 - 7th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
Casualties
were light with only two men wounded during
the day and of course the evacuation of the
wounded was simple compared to what it had
been for the past several days. (See overlay
No. 15 for position of troops)
[23
September 1944]
The
sector was very quiet throughout the night
and at daylight of the morning of 23 September
the First Battalion was moving up on their
objective while the Second Battalion was
moving back into the assembly area (See overlay
No. 16) leaving an outpost on Hill 769 as
a contact with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron
on our left flank. The Second Battalion patrols
were to Vernio (725994) and had returned
after finding the town empty. The Third Battalion
patrols were progressing up the right side
of the road northwest into Montepiano. At
0900 hours the First Battalion had completely
occupied their half of objective "A" (See
overlay No. 16) and elements were moving
to 727029 to establish a road block.
At
0930 hours, this Headquarters was notified
by Division G-3 that the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron was being pulled out of the line
and was being replaced as soon as possible
with the 34th Reconnaissance Squadron. At
the same time this Regiment was order to
secure Vernio so a platoon of Company "F" was
sent out on the mission and was ordered to
patrol as far as Quirico (722000). Company "B" was
to move forward along the road leading northwest
to La Crocuta and Canturato, with Company "A" moving
to the north and with Company "C" to
follow to follow to the rear of Company "B",
along the road northwest to Montepiano. The
Regimental Commander, Colonel Gustav J. Braun,
attached himself to the first platoon of
Company "B", which at that time
was moving northwest along the road to Canturato
and ordered them to push north. Upon reaching
Canturato and after capturing twelve prisoners
and five mules, they continued north along
the road toward the town of Rusubbiani, encountering
several machine guns firing in their general
direction. Colonel Braun immediately radioed
to the rear requesting mortar fire to be
placed on the machine gun positions. The
mortar fire silenced these machine guns immediately
and the platoon continued the advance. At
1300 hours, upon reaching the intersection
of the road running north and south at Montepiano,
two patrols were formed. One patrol had the
mission of patrolling north from Montepiano
and the other to the south along the road
with the mission to reconnoiter the roads
forward and secure as many bridges as possible.
Second Lieutenant Meyer Kasten, the Platoon
Leader, took command of the patrol going
north to which the Regimental Commander attached
himself. At 1500 hours, the First Battalion
Commander, Lt. Colonel Sarratt T. Hames,
and the Forward Command Post of the First
Battalion, moved on to the near vicinity
of Montepiano and the Battalion Commander
proceeded into the town of Montepiano to
contact the Regimental Commander and radio
the location of the First Battalion to Regimental
Headquarters. The balance of Company " B",
Company "D", Company "C" and
then Company "A", moved into the
vicinity of the town, followed by Company "I" while
the First Battalion had strong combat patrols
out to the north as far as the 058 grid line.
All bridges and culverts that were found
intact were placed under guard. A total of
twenty prisoners were captured and ten enemy
were killed by our artillery, mortar and
grenade fire.
Throughout
the day our troops had met no organized resistance,
action being confined to patrol action and
isolated pockets of resistance. Reports indicated
that the enemy was heading north at various
points and so our tired troops increased
their activity, cleaning out small pockets
of enemy and taking small groups of prisoners
from time to time throughout the day. As
soon as all resistance in this sector had
been eliminated and in accordance with Divisional
Operational Instructions Number Ninety, this
Regiment was to go in Division Reserve.
Early
in the evening, Division G-3 issued the following
orders to the Regimental S-3, Captain Earl
T. Ralf: Our platoon of attached tanks were
to start north from Montepiano and go as
far north up the main road as possible, preceded
by the Regimental I & R platoon and supported
by a platoon of Infantry, with the mission
of protecting such bridges and culverts as
had been left intact by the enemy. This task
force was to continue up the road as far
as possible until the 34th Reconnaissance
Squadron, which had relieved the 91st Reconnaissance
Squadron, overtook them and at which time
the Regiment would be relieved and pass into
Division reserve. The plan was worked out
and a platoon of Infantry, fully equipped
with automatic weapons, was detached from
the First Battalion to support the tanks.
At 2100 hours, the Assistant S-2, Captain
Edwin A. Meany Jr., in command of this task
force, left the forward Regimental Command
Post for Montepiano to carry out this mission.
But before our task force was able to start
advancing up the road, elements of the 34th
Reconnaissance Squadron appeared at Montepiano,
headed north, and took over the mission of
our command, that of relieving the security
on the bridges and culverts north of Montepiano,
officially relieving this Regiment. The Regiment
then passed into Division reserve.
During
the day we had no large scale organized enemy
resistance, all opposition coming from isolated
pockets of enemy which had been cut off by
our troops and these pockets our troops methodically
cleaned up. Small amounts of prisoners were
captured from time to time, also large stores
of enemy arms, ammunition and equipment were
captured. Sixty six prisoners were captured
with Company "B" taking twenty
two, Company "K" fourteen, Company "C" thirteen,
Headquarters Company Third Battalion ten,
Company "I" four, Headquarters
Company First Battalion two and Company "F" one,
from the following enemy units:
5 -
2nd Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
6 - 4th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
8 - 6th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
9 - 7th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
2 - 8th Company, 754th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
5 - 1st Battalion Headquarters, 755th Regt.,
334th Inf. Div.
4 - 1st Company, 755th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
1 - 4th Company, 755th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
2 - 1st Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
5 - 3rd Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
3 - 4th Company, 334th Fusilier Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
15 - 1st Company, 334th Reserve Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
1 - 2nd Company, 334th Engineer Bn., [334th
Inf. Div.]
[24
September 1944]
With
the Regiment in Division reserve as of 0400
hours, 24 September 1944, the Regiment carried
on patrolling throughout the night and a
motorized patrol from the Second Battalion
patrolled the road from Quirico to Montepiano,
the road was found passable for peeps all
the way. The attached platoons from the 757th
Tank Battalion and the platoon from the 807th
Tank Destroyers were detached for the time
being. During the day the Battalions assembled
in place but due to heavy enemy shelling
of Montepiano, the First Battalion was forced
to move further south than was planned (See
overlay No. 17 for assembly area). Three
prisoners were captured during the day by
Company "K" from the following
enemy units:
1 -
1st Company, 755th Regt., 334th Inf. Div.
2
- Headquarters Company, 754th Regt., 334th
Inf. Div.
Fifty
six Infantry replacements were received during
the day and distributed to the units. The
Regimental S-1 Section and Headquarters Company
Rear Detachment moved from the location of
Barberino to S. Margherita.
During
the morning hours of 24 September, a report
was received that the 6th South African Division
was moving up on our left flank and so a
patrol from the First Battalion was sent
out to make contact with them, which they
did at 1100 hours at 705025.
All
during the day, elements of our troops engaged
in salvage work, covering the territory of
our recent fighting and recovered much of
our arms, ammunition and equipment that had
been lost or left behind. Also large stores
of enemy equipment were found and salvaged.
During the evening, the road block which
had been maintained at Montepiano by the
First Battalion, was withdrawn. The Regiment,
being in Division reserve, spent the time
in cleaning and replacing equipment and resting
after the recent operations.
During
the recent operations, this Regiment had
attacked one of the most heavily defended
sectors of the Gothic Line. We started operations
with a very good knowledge of enemy defenses,
gained from excellent aerial photos and air
Out Posts and also, as we approached the
outposts of the Gothic Line, knowledge was
added from time to time on captured prisoner
reports. We made our first physical contact
with the enemy on 12 September 1944, taking
our first prisoners of this operation on
that date. The assault on the Gothic Line
was accompanied by very fierce fighting,
our path being continuously blacked by extensive
minefields covered by enemy machine gun fire.
Although the weather as a whole was favorable,
the nature of the terrain, it being very
mountainous and almost totally without roads,
was universally in favor of the enemy, giving
him perfect defensive ground. We assaulted
the main Gothic Line for a period of nine
days, cracking through one of the most heavily
defended sectors, as the accompanying overprint
of enemy defenses will indicate. During the
complete operations to date, this Regiment
captured three hundred and fifty three since
the landings at Salerno, Italy on 22 September
1943. Although the enemy was well entrenched,
had pill-boxes and extremely well defended
and constructed bunkers, protected by wire
and lanes of fire, this Regiment at the end
of nine days of fierce combat, had broken
the Gothic Line at this point and all that
remained being mopping up operations as many
pockets of enemy had been cut off and surrounded
as a result of our columns outflanking them.
Casualties for this period were the highest
the Regiment had experienced in such a short
time of combat with ninety one killed in
action and four hundred and thirty two wounded
in action.
[26-30
September 1944]
In
a very impressive ceremony at 1100 hours,
26 September 1944, Major General Charles
L. Bolte, the 34th Infantry Division Commanding
General, presented seven Silver Stars for
gallantry in action, eleven Bronze Stars
for Heroic achievement in action and six
34th Infantry Division Citations for outstanding
performance of Duty, to enlisted men and
officers of this command. Four companies
from the Second Battalion constituted the
guard of Honor and the division Military
Band offered the military marches.
Thirty
new Infantry replacements were received during
the day and distributed to the rifle companies.
Major Edward M. Fabert was assigned to the
Regiment and assigned to command the First
Battalion, Lt. Colonel Sarratt T. Hames having
been relieved of his command and re-assigned
as Regimental Executive Officer.
Various
forms of entertainment were presented for
our resting troops including picture shows
and Band Concerts by the Division Military
Band. On the afternoon of 27 September, this
Headquarters was ordered to send out reconnaissance
parties to select a new assembly area on
the right of the Division Sector in the vicinity
of Montecarelli.
The
reconnaissance party left at 1530 hours and
returned at 1830 hours, having selected the
areas for the future movement.
The
weather was now turning cold and with steady
rain, making it very uncomfortable for the
troops but some items of winter clothing
were issued. (See overlay No. 18 for assembly
area)
The
entire Regiment moved from the Vicinity of
S. Margherita to the Vicinity of Montecarelli
(806997) on the afternoon of 28 September
1944. The Regiment leaving the old area at
1505 hours and closing in at 1600 hours,
a movement of fifteen miles over rough muddy
roads. The weather was most disagreeable
with cold rain falling and a very high wind.
The troops, being hauled in open trucks,
were wet to the bone upon arrival at the
new location and about froze during the long
cold hours of the night.
During
the day of 29 September, as a consequence
of telephone conversations with the Division
G-3, our Battalions and separate units were
each notified to be on the alert for a possible
move the next day to a new assembly area
at Madonna dei Fornelli, prepartatory to
entering the line on the 1st of October.
At midnight the troops were notified that
the move was definite, that the time of crossing
the I.P. would be 1140 hours the next morning,
order of march to be Cannon Company, Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, Third Battalion,
Second Battalion and First Battalion. The
Anti-Tank Company was to be used as litter
bearers in future operations with the exception
of the mine teams, one of which was attached
to each Battalion.
Seventy
five Infantry Replacements were received
during the day and distributed to the companies.
At
approximately 0830 hours, 30 September, quartering
parties left the Regimental Command Post
to select assembly areas in the vicinity
of Madonna dei Fornelli and at 1200 hours
the Regimental Command Post closed with the
exception of the S-1 Section, Service Company,
Anti-Tank Company and the Rear Detachment
of the Regimental Headquarters Company.
The
Regimental Forward Command Post closed in
the new Command Post at Madonna dei Fornelli
(812160) at 1430 hours. (See overlay No.
19) The troops moved up by trucks to a detrucking
point about five miles south of Madonna dei
Fornelli, marching the remaining distance.
The Cannon Company closed in at 1700 hours,
and the balance of the Regiment at 1930 hours.
The 34th Division Liaison Officer reported
in to the Regimental Command Post at 2030
hours with Division Field Order No. 47, instructing
this Regiment to enter the line on the right
flank of the 168th Infantry Regiment and
to attack north at 0600 hours the morning
of the 1st of October. During the evening,
plans for attack were prepared by the Regimental
Staff. Plans for the attack are as indicated
on Field Order No. 20, this Headquarters,
as are the positions of our troops at the
close of the period.
A steady
rain has been falling all day and the temperature
was steadily falling. The roads were in a
very poor condition making it almost impossible
to drive heavy trucks and equipment over
the narrow, winding mountain trails of the
Gothic Line region.
With
the close of the period, this Regiment was
still in the attack, slowly progressing against
stubborn, determined resistance in the rugged
terrain of the Apennine Mountains of Italy.
For
the Regimental Commander:
SARRATT T. HAMES
Lt Col., Infantry
Executive Officer
OFFICIAL:
s/Donald L. Nabity
DONALD L. NABITY
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant